Abstract: The sensitivity of Bayesian implementation to agents'beliefs about others suggests the use of more robust notions of implementation such as ex-post implementation, which requires that each agent's strategy be optimal for every possible realization of the types of other agents. We show that the only deterministic social choice functions that are ex-post implementable in generic mechanism design frameworks with multi-dimensional signals, interdependent valuations and transferable utilities, are constant functions. In other words, deterministic ex-post implementation requires that the same alternative must be chosen irrespective of agents'signals. The proof shows that ex-post implementability of a non-trivial deterministic social choice function implies that certain rates of information substitution coincide for all agents. This condition amounts to a system of di¤erential equations that are not satis…ed by generic valuation functions. 1 The editor and three referees made many very helpful comments. We also wish to thank
Introduction
Bayesian implementation is frequently criticized because it can be sensitive to the precise information that agents (and the designer) have about the characteristics of other agents. This seems especially important in practice because it is not clear how agents form beliefs about others. Dominantstrategy implementation responds to this criticism by requiring that each agent's strategy be optimal, not only against the actual strategies of other agents, but against all possible strategies of other agents. In particular, dominant strategy implementation requires that each agent's strategy be independent of the actual type of other agents, and in this sense is robust to informational errors.
Unfortunately, as Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) have shown, if there are at least three social alternatives and preferences are unrestricted, then only dictatorial choice rules are dominant-strategy implementable. On the other hand, for environments in which preferences are quasi-linear in money and agents preferences are independent of the information held by others, the celebrated Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms provide dominantstrategy implementation of the e¢ cient choice function.
The assumption of private values is very restrictive: in many interesting situations, each agents'valuation of alternatives depends on information known only by other agents. The literature on implementation with interdependent values has typically maintained quasi-linear utilities as an assumption that is necessary (in view of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite results) and reasonable (when …nancial stakes are moderate). In such environments, insisting on robustness to the information of others is formalized as ex-post implementation, which requires the strategy of each agent to be optimal against the strategies of other agents for every possible realization of types (as opposed to Bayesian implementation, which requires that the strategy of each agent be optimal against the strategies of other agents for the given distribution of types).
2 Ex-post implementation is weaker than dominant-strategy implementation since it assumes that other agents follow their equilibrium strategy -but it shares the appealing property that agents need not know the distribution of others'signals in order to …nd it optimal to follow their equilibrium strategies.
Our main result is a generic impossibility theorem for ex-post implementation of deterministic social choice functions: restricting to environments in which utilities are quasi-linear but interdependent and types (or signals) are multi-dimensional, we show that, for generic valuation functions, the only deterministic social choice rules that are ex-post implementable are constant . Our assertion is uniform over deterministic social choice rules, and hence is much stronger than the assertion that, for each given deterministic social choice rule, the set of valuations for which the given rule is not ex-post implementable is generic.
The environments we consider include many familiar and practical social choice problems. For instance, consider the decision about whether to improve a roadway, and how to assign costs. Construction will typically affect …rms along the roadway in a number of ways, such as lack of customer access during construction and increased customer access after completion. In particular, signals are multi-dimensional. Moreover, valuations are interdependent, because the estimates of each …rm are imperfect (and would be improved by knowing the estimates of each other …rm), because of competition between the …rms, and because of positive spillovers across …rms.
Our analysis proceeds in two steps. The …rst step shows that if any non-constant determinstic choice function is ex-post implementable then a certain geometric condition on utility functions must be satis…ed; the second step shows that this geometric condition is not satis…ed for generic utility functions. This is done both for a topological and for a measure-theoretic notion of genericity.
The geometric condition connects the agents'rates of information substitution, which measure how marginal variations in the several dimensions of one agent's signal a¤ect the agents'payo¤s. The condition is derived from the taxation principle which implies that, in an ex-post incentive compatible mechanism, all agents have the same indi¤erence sets (the sets of states at which the agent is indi¤erent between two given alternatives). We show that, on these common indi¤erence sets, marginal variations in signals must a¤ect all agents' valuations in the same way. For multi-dimensional signals, the existence of transfers that equate the implied rates of information substitu-tion amounts to the assertion that valuations satisfy a system of di¤erential equations of a particular kind. We then show that generic valuations do not satisfy any such system of di¤erential equations.
One way to put the present work in perspective is to recall the literature on e¢ cient ex-post implementation. A number of authors have shown that e¢ cient ex-post implementation is possible when signals are one-dimensional and satisfy a single-crossing property (see Cremer and McLean, 1985; Maskin, 1992; Ausubel, 1997; Dasgupta and Maskin, 2000; Jehiel and Moldovanu, 2001; Bergemann and Välimäki, 2002; and Perry and Reny, 2002) . Maskin (2003) o¤ers an excellent survey 3 .
The restriction to one-dimensional signals is essential. It is not a-priori obvious what the analog of the single-crossing property is for settings with multi-dimensional signals, nor whether it would imply e¢ cient implementability. When at least one agent's signal is two-dimensional (and the distribution of signals is independent across agents), Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) have shown that, for generic valuations, the e¢ cient social choice rule is not Bayesian implementable, and hence a fortiori not ex-post implementable 4 . But, the impossibility of implementing the e¢ cient social choice rule does not imply the impossibility of implementing other social choice rules. The present paper shows that, no matter what de…nition of single-crossing one uses, the set of valuations for which non-trivial implementation is possible is non-generic. Thus, the impossibility result of the present paper is much stronger than the impossibility result of Jehiel and Moldovanu. The proof of the present impossibility theorem is much more di¢ cult as well. Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) show that e¢ cient implementation implies that the preferences of one agent must be aligned with the social preferences; we show that non-constant implementation implies that the preferences of two agents must be aligned with each other. The important di¤erence is that the social preferences are …xed by the valuation functions, whereas the preferences of any pair of agents can be altered by an endogenous transfer.
A second way to put our work in perspective is to recall the literature on robust mechanism design. Wilson (1987) has pointed out that the success of many of the schemes that rely on Bayes-Nash implementation depend on the beliefs of the agents or of the mechanism designer in a sensitive way: if the agents or the designer are mistaken in their beliefs, the actual outcome of a supposedly optimal mechanism may be far from the intended one. To address this problem, it seems natural to require that the designer wants to implement a social choice function that depends only on the payo¤-relevant types (the marginal distribution of which is more likely to be known to the designer) but not on the belief-types of the agents. Bergemann and Morris (2005) show that if a social choice function is Bayes-Nash implementable for every system of beliefs and higher order beliefs that can be associated with the given payo¤-types, then it must be ex-post implementable 5 . Combining their result with ours implies in the present context that the designer can only implement constant choice rules. In particular, our impossibility result draws attention to a potential disadvantage of the "belief free"approach: in a simple example, we show that the designer may prefer a belief-dependent choice function over any belief-independent choice function (which would be trivial by our main result), even if she adopts the worst case scenario about agents'beliefs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we describe the mechanism design problem, we de…ne the ex-post equilibrium concept, and we derive a helpful "taxation principle." In Section 3 we provide a geometric condition on valuations that must hold in order for a non-trivial ex-post implementable and deterministic choice function to exist, and we apply the geometric intuition to a speci…c example, yielding generic impossibility in that case. In Section 4 we present the various employed notions of genericity, and we derive the impossibility result by showing that the above geometric conditions induce a system of di¤erential equations that has no solution generically. In Section 5 we describe connections to related work, and we discuss our main assumptions and result. In particular, we review several interesting, but non-generic settings where non-trivial implementation is possible. Section 6 gathers several concluding remarks. Proofs are collected in Section 7.
By requiring optimality of i's truth-telling for every realization of other agents information s i , equation (1) treats s i as if it was known to agent i. Her incentive constraint is thus equivalent to a monopolistic screening problem for every s i . Thus, the central authority can post personalized prices t i k (s i ) for the various alternatives, and let the individuals choose among them. In equilibrium all agents must agree on a most favorable alternative, yielding:
Lemma 2.1 (Ex-Post Taxation Principle) (see Chung and Ely, 2003) The choice function is implementable if and only if for all i 2 N , k 2 K and s i 2 S i , there are transfers
The proof of our main result, Theorem 4.2 consists of two major steps: Proposition 3.3 in the next Section shows that the existence of a non-trivial ex-post implementable choice function implies a geometric condition on the gradients of the relative valuation functions; Proposition 4.3 in Section 4 shows that this geometric condition cannot be satis…ed generically.
The Geometry of Ex-Post Implementation
Because agents'incentives are only responsive to di¤erences in payo¤s, it is convenient to focus on relative valuations i and relative transfers i :
For technical simplicity, we assume that relative valuations satisfy the mild requirement r s i i (s) 6 = 0 for all s 2 S. proof fails on the boundary of the type space. Alternatively, we could have assumed open type spaces to start with. 8 That is, agent i's relative valuation is everywhere responsive to i's own signal. Theorem 4.2 can be adapted to allow for relative valuations that are not everywhere responsive to own signals -and in particular to allow for interior maxima -but the additional complication makes the argument less transparent without seeming to add any useful insights.
The geometric condition derived in Proposition 3.3 below relies on an argument on the intersection of the closures of the areas in the signal space S where alternatives k and l, respectively, are chosen (in other words, this intersection is the boundary that separates the two areas.) De…nition 3.1 The indi¤erence set I of a choice function is de…ned by:
For an indi¤erence signal b s 2 I, we de…ne the indi¤erence set with …xed b s i to be
The taxation principle states that, in an incentive compatible mechanism, all agents agree that the chosen alternative is the most favorable one. If relative transfers are continuous, this implies that the indi¤erence set of the choice function and the indi¤erence sets of all agents must coincide. The following lemma formalizes this assertion.
Lemma 3.2 Let ( ; t) be a non-trivial ex-post incentive compatible mechanism with continuous relative transfers i .
1. The indi¤erence set of the choice function coincides with the indifference set of each of the agents, i.e., for every b s 2 int S and i 2 f1; 2g, we have
2. For all b s 2 I, I i (b s) coincides with fs 2 int S :
If relative transfers are di¤erentiable, the gradient of an agent's payo¤ function is perpendicular to her indi¤erence set. Thus, the coincidence of 9 Continuity of i and i as well as r s i i (s) 6 = 0 are necessary for this result. Whereas the assumptions on i are standard, the assumption on the endogenous function i is only used for this intermediate result. The case of discontinuous i is covered by point two of Proposition 3.3 which does not depend on this result. the agents'indi¤erence sets as expressed in (3) implies that the gradients of agents'payo¤ functions must be co-directional on the indi¤erence set:
If condition (4) were to fail, there would be a perturbation s " of s that makes alternative k favorable for agent i and l more favorable to j, contradicting the taxation principle.
Condition (4) says that the payo¤ functions of agent i and i have the same rate of information substitution: the relative e¤ect on payo¤s of changing any two dimensions of the signal must coincide for all agents. While condition (4) carries the main geometric intuition, one might not immediately see the considerable restrictions it implies, as the transfer functions i and i are chosen endogenously. The following proposition, which will serve as the basis for the genericity argument in Section 4, shows a condition that follows from (4) and that does not rely on the transfer functions.
Proposition 3.3 Let ( ; t) be a non-trivial ex-post incentive compatible mechanism.
If the relative transfers
i are continuous on int S i for all i 2 f1; 2g then there are an indi¤erence signal b s 2 I, and a vector y 2 R d i such that 
For di¤erentiable relative transfer functions, a proof for Proposition 3.3 is simple: Condition (5) is the upper half of Condition (4) after setting y = r s i i (s i ). The full proof is slightly more complicated because the relative transfer functions are not known to be di¤erentiable, or even continuous.
As an illustration, we apply Proposition 3.3 to a setting with bi-linear valuations and 2-dimensional signals
In this case, nontrivial implementation implies a simple algebraic condition (easily seen not to hold generically) on the coe¢ cients of the valuation functions. Proposition 7.3 will generalize this example to the class of all polynomials of degree less than a su¢ ciently large integer.
Example 3.4 De…ne valuations v by:
For a vector y = y k y l , we have
It is readily veri…ed that b 
The above condition is obviously non-generic: the set of parameters where it is satis…ed has zero Lebesgue-measure in the 8-dimensional space of coe¢ -cients that parameterize the bi-linear valuations in this example.
Generic Impossibility
We now show that the geometric conditions 5 and 6 derived in Proposition 3.3 cannot be generically satis…ed.
We use two notions of genericity. The …rst is topological. If E is a complete metric space, recall that every open subset U E also admits a complete metric.
A of open and dense sets A U . Residual sets are generally viewed as (topologically) large, and their complements as small. In particular, the Baire Category Theorem guarantees that residual sets of complete metric spaces are dense.
The second notion of genericity is measure-theoretic. Let E be a complete metric topological vector space, U an open subset of E and A a Borel subset of U: We say that A is …nitely shy in U if there is a …nite dimensional subspace F E such that A meets every translate of F in a set of Lebesgue measure 0 (equivalently, if every translate of A meets F in a set of Lebesgue measure 0). 10 . A Borel set A U is …nitely prevalent in U if the relative complement U n A is …nitely shy in U . Hunt et al. (1992) and Anderson and Zame (2001) have argued that …nite prevalence, and prevalence, which is a generalization, provide a sensible measure-theoretic notion of "largeness" for in…nite-dimensional spaces of parameters. In particular, if E = R n then B = U n A is …nitely prevalent in U if and only if the Lebesgue measure of A is 0.
In general, these two notions of genericity are di¤erent -even in …nite dimensional spaces. However, aside from a technical issue on the degree of di¤erentiability required of the relative valuation function under consideration, we show that ex-post implementation is generically impossible in both the topological and the measure-theoretic sense.
2 that admit an m-times continuously di¤erentiable extension 10 If F has dimension n; say, any linear isomorphism between F and R n induces a measure on F . All such measures are mutually absolutely continuous, and have the same null sets. Hence, it is consistent to abuse terminology by saying that a subset of F -or any translate of F -has Lebesgue measure 0 if it has measure 0 for one -hence allof these induced measures.
to an open neighborhood of S, equipped with the topology of uniform convergence of maps and m derivatives. To prove the Theorem, …x valuation functions 
2 satisfy a certain set of …rst-order di¤erential equations. It is not hard to see that generic valuations functions do not satisfy these di¤erential equations. However, this is not enough, because Proposition 4.3 does not say that generic valuation functions fail to satisfy these di¤erential equations for prescribed b s and y, but rather that generic valuation functions do not satisfy these di¤erential equations for any b s and y. But, varying b s and y does not o¤er enough degrees of freedom to guarantee that r s i i (s) and r s i i (s) y are co-directional at every point of the non-trivial manifold I i (b s).
Discussion

Dictatorship
In the private values setting, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem asserts that only dictatorial social choice functions are dominant strategy implementable. It might seem that dictatorial rules should be ex-post implementable in our interdependent valuations setting as well.
Note that "dictatorship" is ambiguous, because the dictator's valuation v i depends on i's information s i . If a social choice rule always selects the alternative for which, given all signals, dictator i has the highest valuation, then (s) depends of course on all signals. Point 1 of Proposition 3.3 shows that this is impossible, because the agents'incentive constraints cannot be simultaneously satis…ed.
Secondly, a rule that is dictatorial in the sense that (s) depends only on the dictator's information s i is generically not implementable either: The relative transfer to the other agent i (s i ) implied by the taxation principle has to be discontinuous, and point 2 of Proposition 3.3 shows that, generically, i's incentive constraint cannot be satis…ed for all s i .
Lastly, the mechanism that lets agent i choose the alternative (solely based on i's information) does not induce a choice function according to our terminology since i's choice will depend both on her belief type and on her payo¤ relevant type s i . In Example 5.1 below, we show that a designer may prefer this belief-dependent dictatorial choice rule over any ex-post implementable choice rule.
E¢ cient Implementation
As we have noted, Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) show that for generic valuations, e¢ cient Bayes implementation is impossible; hence for generic valuations, e¢ cient ex-post implementation is impossible as well. Our result is stronger because it applies to all non-constant social choice rules simultaneously, not just to the e¢ cient rule.
To understand the mathematical relation between the results, assume for simplicity that only agent i holds private information; write N = 1 + 2 and assume r s i 6 = 0. E¢ cient ex-post implementation implies that there is a di¤erence in transfers = i , such that society is indi¤erent between the alternatives if and only if this is the case for agent i. Mathematically, this means that the level set ( i ) 1 ( ) must coincide with the indi¤erence set of the e¢ cient choice function I ef f := N 1 (0). Hence:
Thus, e¢ cient implementation is only possible if there is a congruence between the private and social rates of information substitution. In contrast, the condition given here for non-trivial implementation requires a congruence of private rates for any two agents i and i: Whereas the social preference is exogenously …xed by the agents'valuations, agent i's preferences depend on the endogenous transfer i .
Max-Min Beliefs and Ex-Post Implementation
Chung and Ely (2004) study a private-values auction where the distribution of payo¤-relevant types is known to the designer. They show that a revenue-maximizing designer who adopts a worst-case scenario about the agents'beliefs prefers a dominant-strategy mechanism over any Bayes-Nash implementable scheme. In contrast, the example below shows in our interdependent values framework that the designer may prefer a belief-dependent choice function, even if she adopts the "worst-case"scenario about the agents' beliefs. 
where is a small positive number. The good must be allocated to either agent 1 or 2, and the designer is happy (gets 1) whenever the good is allocated to an agent who values the good no less than 0:5 and not happy (gets 0) otherwise. Proposition 3.3 implies (see also Example 5.2 below) that only trivial choice rules are ex-post implementable. It is readily veri…ed that, as ! 0, the designer's expected payo¤ associated with a trivial choice rule is 0:5. Consider now a non-trivial mechanism: the designer lets agent 1 decide …rst whether or not to buy the object at price 0:5; if agent 1 decides not to buy, the good is allocated to agent 2: Because agent 1's choice depends on her belief about c 2 ; this mechanism is not expost implementable for any > 0. Assuming that the support of agent 1's belief remains bounded, even in the worst scenario about 1's belief on c 2 , the designer's payo¤ converges to 
The Limits of the Impossibility Result
In this Subsection we show how weakening the assumptions in our impossibility result opens the door to ex-post implementation in a number of interesting cases. We explain the mechanics in terms of our previous structural results (Propositions 3.3 and 4.3).
One strategic agent
Suppose that only agent i has private information, while the designer knows the information of all agents other than i. In this case, Proposition 3.3 is void of content. Let t i k = t i k (s i ) be any transfer to agent i in alternative k (this may be constantly zero). Then the non-trivial social choice function that implements any outcome (s) 2 arg max k fv
Even though this seems a trivial point, we note, by contrast, that the e¢ cient social choice rule is not ex-post implementable in this setting (see Jehiel and Moldovanu, 2001 ).
Separable Valuations
Suppose valuation functions are separable; i.e., there are functions f
Of course, separable valuation functions are non-generic. Condition 4 requires that
is co-directional on I with
Note that the upper half of the above expressions is independent of s i . Hence, the two gradients can be equalized everywhere by setting, for example, Jehiel et al. (2004) have shown (using Roberts ' (1979) result about dominant strategy implementation in private values settings) that a choice rule is ex-post implementable only if it is an a¢ ne maximizer , i.e., only if it is of the form
for agent-speci…c weights j 0 and alternative-speci…c weights k 2 R. 
12;13
Now suppose that the seller may keep the object. Bikchandani shows how to ex-post implement the allocation where buyer i = 1; 2 gets the object if p . Thus, the indi¤erence set is a manifold of dimension one contained in the boundary of the signal space, and the construction used to prove Proposition 4.3 does not work. Note too that the object is not sold if the buyers have valuations that are close to each other (eg., at
This must happen precisely in order to avoid a higher-dimensional boundary between the alternatives where the object is sold. It can be shown that Bikchandani's mechanism is ex-post incentive-e¢ cient.
The transfers used in Bikhchandani's subtle construction closely follow the logic of e¢ cient implementation with interdependent values and onedimensional signals. This works since in one-object auctions without allocative externalities agent i's multidimensional signal a¤ects her utility in the unique alternative where i wins.
One-dimensional signals
As mentioned in the Introduction, e¢ cient, ex-post implementation is possible if all agents have one-dimensional signals, and if a single-crossing property holds. The single-crossing property is determined by strict inequalities, and it is satis…ed for an open set of valuations. The gradients of utility functions are now scalars, and the parallelism condition has no bite. The impossibility result requires that at least two agents have multi-dimensional signals. When only one agent has a multi-dimensional signal, the boundary between areas where di¤erent allocations are chosen may have dimension zero, so the door is open to possibility results, as we now illustrate: 12 Alternatively, a consideration of the cross product c i y b + y a c i = 0 yields y b = 0 and y a = 1. This shows that r s i i (s) and (r s i i (s) (1; 0) T ) are co-linear, but point in opposite directions.
13 Condition (2) of that Proposition isn't satis…ed either. To see this, note that the direction of r s i i (s) = 1; c i T cannot be locally independent of s i . Thus, non-trivial implementation fails also with discontinuous transfers. Consider now the choice function
By condition (11), for a …xed s 2 there is s 1 (s 2 ) such that
For agent 1 we apply the standard technique from the literature with onedimensional signals, and we set transfer 1 (s 2 ) = 1 (s 1 (s 2 )) : Using the monotonicity assumption in equation (10) we get that
By equations (15) and (13) ( ; t) is incentive compatible. It is non-trivial by equation (12) . Note that for generic , the choice function is nondictatorial.
Conclusion
Ex-post implementation (as opposed to Bayesian implementation) is important if we wish to allow for the possibility that the agents or the designer may have insu¢ cient or erroneous information about relevant features of the environment. We have shown that non-trivial ex-post implementation is impossible in generic quasi-linear environments with interdependent preferences and multidimensional signal spaces.
We see a number of directions for future research: 1) Extend the impossibility result to stochastic social choice functions. This is technically demanding, but we expect that a similar impossibility result holds.
2) Identify additional important (non-generic) classes of valuations for which ex-post implementation is possible.
3) In every setting for which Bayesian implementation of some social choice function is possible with respect to some priors but ex-post implementation fails, there will be some "maximal information mechanism"that allows for posterior implementation a la Green and La¤ont (1987) . What are the properties of these mechanisms ? 4) Identify and characterize those situations where a designer who adopts "worst-case" beliefs would choose an ex-post implementable mechanism, and those where he would not. (This exercise will shed some light on the price that one has to pay for employing belief-free mechanisms.) 2) I i (b s) = fs 2 int S :
g is immediate from the above. Since we assumed that r s i i is non-vanishing, we can apply the implicit function theorem to conclude that
To prove Proposition 3.3, we …rst state a simple Lemma.
Lemma 7.1 Let and be smooth functions on an open set X R N . Assume that there exists x 2 X such that (x) = (x) = 0, but r (x) and r (x) are not co-directional. Then there exists x 0 arbitrarily close to x such that (x 0 ) < 0 < (x 0 ).
Proof. As r (x) and r (x) are not co-directional, there exists a direction 2 R N with r (x) < 0 < r (x). For x 0 = x + " , with " > 0, we get (x 0 ) < 0 < (x 0 ), as desired. This argument is illustrated in Figure  1 .
Proof of Proposition 3.3. Consider an ex-post incentive compatible mechanism ( ; t) and the associated relative valuations and transfers. 1) If is di¤erentiable, the discussion preceding the Proposition together with Lemma 7.1 completes the proof. More generally, we need to deal with two sub-cases: 
Figure 1: If the gradients of and are not co-directional at x, the functions disagree at some
. By choosing su¢ ciently large, r s i i (s) and (r s i i (b s i ; s i ) y) must be co-directional, and condition (5) is satis…ed.
1.b)
The direction of the gradient r s i i (s) varies in s 2 I i (b s). In this case we will show that i is di¤erentiable at some e s i close to b s i . As a …rst step, we show that the directional derivatives
. By agent i's incentive constraint, we have b s i + " ; s i = k and (b s i + " ; s i ) = l for small enough " > 0 (compare this argument to the one for Lemma 7.1). In turn,
. As s i and s i approach s i ,and " approaches zero, this entails
In order to conclude, we need to show that these directional derivatives are continuous in s i . Consider e s i = b s i + " for some 2 and " 2 R su¢ ciently small. By the above argument, there is a neighborhood U of e s i , such that the directional derivatives 2) Assume now that the relative transfer i is discontinuous at some b
14 By assumption, there is a sequence of i's signals (s
Modulo taking a subsequence, we can assume that lim n i (s 
For this to be true at some s, the cross product of these vectors must vanish, implying the following condition :
We now argue, that the above condition can be satis…ed for all s in the set I i (b s) only if the coe¢ cients a; b satisfy the algebraic condition (7).
The one-dimensional indi¤erence set I i (b s) can be parametrized by s (7) is satis…ed.
Generic Impossibility
We turn now to the proof of the genericity assertion, Proposition 4.3. Write d = d 1 + d 2 , and let P 2dr be the space of polynomials on R d of degree at most 2dr. We need the following lemma, whose simple proof is left to the reader.
Lemma 7.2 Let s 1 ; : : : ; s r be distinct points in R d and let fa i : 1 i rg and fa ij : 1 i r; 1 j dg be families of real numbers. There is a polynomial P 2 P 2dr such that for all i; j:
Recall that we …xed r > Moreover, the intersection M = T M i is also residual and has full Lebesgue measure in M 0 , and every pair ( 1 ; 2 ) 2 M enjoys the four properties above.
Proof. Write (int S) (r) for the open subset of (int S) r consisting of distinct r-tuples. To construct M 1 , write
For each n = 1; : : : ; r de…ne
1 ; 2 ; s 1 ; : : : ; s r ; 1 ; : : : ; r ; y; w; c)
Finally, write = ( 1 ; : : : ; r ) :
Because the components of are either linear functions or evaluations of …rst derivatives of (p + 1)-times continuously di¤erentiable functions, itself is p-times continuously di¤erentiable. Using Lemma 7.2, it is easy to check that for every
Hence, the transversality theorem (see Mas-Colell (1985) for instance) provides a subset M 1 M 0 that is residual and of full measure such that, for each ( 1 ; 2 ) 2 M 1 , the set
is either empty or is a manifold of dimension
To see that M 1 has the desired property (1), suppose not, so that there exist b s 2 int S and y 2 R d 1 such that r s 1 1 (s) and r s 1 2 (s) y are collinear for each s 2Ĩ 1 (b s). If z 1 ; : : : ; z r are distinct points ofĨ 1 (b s) then we can …nd 1 ; : : : ; r 2 R such that 
b s 1 ; q 1 ; : : : ; q r ; y; 1 ; : : : ; r ) = r s 1 1 (b s 1 ; q n ) n y Finally, write = ( 1 ; : : : ; r ) :
As above, we use the transversality theorem to …nd a residual set of full measure
2 ) = fv : (b s 1 ; q 1 ; : : : ; q r ; y; 1 ; : : : ; r ) :
is a manifold of dimension
We claim that if ( 1 ; 2 ) 2 M 3 then there does not exist b
and an open set Q int S 2 such that r s 1 1 (b s 1 ; q) and y are collinear for each q 2 Q. To see this, we argue exactly as before: if such existed then the dimension of J( 1 ; 2 ) would be at least as large as rd 2 , whence
This contradicts our choice of r, so we conclude that M 3 has the desired property. To construct M 4 we proceed exactly as above, except that we reverse the roles of 1 ; 2 . Finally, M is residual and of full measure because it is the intersection of a …nite number of sets with these properties.
With Proposition 7.3 in hand, we turn to the proof of Proposition 4.3.
Proof for Proposition 4.3. We begin by constructing G p+1 as the intersection of four sets W 1 ; : : : ; W 4 , corresponding to the various properties, and then use Proposition 7.3 to show that G p+1 has the desired properties.
To construct W 1 and W 2 we proceed in the following way. First choose and …x an increasing sequence of compact sets L 1 ; L 2 ; : : : ; whose union is int S 1 . For each index m, let C(m) be the set of pairs ( 1 ; 2 ) 2 H p+1 for which there exist b s 2 L m , y 2 R d 1 with jyj m, and a subset Z Ĩ 1 (b s) such that: -for every z 2 Z there is a 2 R such that 1 (z) [ 2 (z) y] = 0 and j j m -the projection of Z into some d 2 1-dimensional subspace of R d contains a ball of radius at least 1=m:
It is straightforward to check that each C(m) is a closed subset of H p+1 , so the complement H p+1 n C(m) is open. Set
We construct W 2 in exactly the same way, except that the roles of 1 ; 2 are reversed.
To construct W 3 and W 4 , we proceed as follows. For each index m, let Q(m) be the set of pairs ( 1 ; 2 ) 2 H p+1 for which there exist b s 2 L m , y 2 R d 1 with jyj m, and a ball B S 2 such that:
-for every b 2 B there is a 2 R such that 1 (b s 1 ; b) y = 0 and j j m -the radius of B is at least 1=m
It is easy to see that Q(m) is closed, and hence that H p+1 n Q(m) is open. Set
We construct W 4 in exactly the same way, except that the roles of 1 ; 2 are reversed. To see that G p+1 is residual in H p+1 , let F C p+1 (S; R 2 ) be any …nite dimensional subspace that contains P 2dr . It follows from Proposition 7.3 that G p+1 \ F has full Lebesgue measure in H p+1 \ F ; in particular, G p+1 \ F is dense in H p+1 \ F . Because C p+1 (S; R 2 ) is the union of …nite dimensional subspaces that contain F 0 , we conclude that G p+1 is dense in H p+1 . Because our construction guarantees that G p+1 is the countable intersection of open sets, we conclude that it is residual in H p+1 , as desired.
To construct G 1 we proceed in almost the same way, except that we work in H 1 instead of in H p+1 . For each index m, let C(m) be the set of pairs ( 1 ; 2 ) 2 H 1 for which there exist y 2 R d 1 with jyj m and a subset Z L m such that -for every z 2 Z there is a 2 R such that 1 (z) [ 2 (z) y] = 0 and j j m -the projection of Z into some d 2 1-dimensional subspace of R d contains a ball of radius at least 1=m:
It is straightforward to check that each C(m) is a closed subset of H 1 , so the complement H 1 n C(m) is open. Set
We construct V 2 in exactly the same way, except that the roles of 1 ; 2 are reversed. For each index m, let Q(m) be the set of pairs We construct V 4 in exactly the same way, except that the roles of 1 ; 2 are reversed. Now set G 1 = T V i . By de…nition, G 1 is the countable intersection of open sets. In order to show that it is residual in H 1 ; we need only show it is dense. To this end, view C p+1 (S; R 2 ) as a subset of C 1 (S; R 2 ); and note that G 
